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CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES: A NEW ERA FOR PROTECTING 
DATA GENERATED ON PERSONAL TECHNOLOGY, OR A MERE 
CAVEAT? 
Aaron L. Dalton* 
In deciding Carpenter, a majority of United States Supreme Court 
Justices recognized that, at a fundamental level, historical cell-site 
location information (CSLI) differs from other categories of 
business records in terms of deserving Fourth Amendment 
protection. However, the majority’s opinion is unclear about the 
precise source of this distinction, and about how, or whether, to 
protect other data generated from personal technology in the future. 
Although the majority opinion purports to be limited to CSLI, this 
narrow scope is not in the best interest of consumers. At best, 
Carpenter presents the opportunity to establish a predictable and 
comprehensive system for protecting personal data from 
warrantless search. However, the majority’s approach also risks 
becoming a mere caveat, drawing artificial distinctions between 
CSLI and other types of data that may be equally, or more, sensitive. 
Now that the Supreme Court has recognized some forms of data held 
by businesses are protected from warrantless search, this holding 
should be expanded to protect the increasingly comprehensive 
consumer data that companies acquire. Although Justice Kennedy’s 
dissent in Carpenter highlighted the risks of the majority’s 
unstructured approach, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in United 
States v. Jones provided an aspirational glimpse of how personal 
data could be protected in the future. Courts should read Carpenter 
in conjunction with Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence to 
provide a predictable standard for evaluating personal data 
protections and avoid the uncertain approach that the Carpenter 
majority’s opinion risks establishing. 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2020. The author 
would like to thank Professor Jolynn Dellinger for her insightful commentary 
during the writing process, and the NC JOLT team for their assistance and 
support. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
What protections do consumers operating cell phones or other 
personal devices that generate comprehensive data on users have 
from that data being obtained without a warrant and used in a 
criminal prosecution against them? For years, the answer has been 
“little or none,” an alarming state of affairs in a data-driven society.1 
                                                 
 1 See Daniel Zwerdling, Your Home is Your . . . Snitch? When Your Appliances 
Work as Police Informants, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/05/24/your-home-is-your-snitch 
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Law enforcement may access consumer data without a warrant due 
to the third-party doctrine, which holds that consumers lack a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in personal data contained in 
business records, since this information has been disclosed to, and 
is held by, third parties.2 With the explosion of personal technology,3 
scholars have questioned the validity of the third-party doctrine, as 
business records now consist of highly detailed information about 
consumers, who may not be aware of the scope of information 
collected and stored by companies through consumer use of 
ubiquitous devices.4 
                                                 
(describing law enforcement’s ability to use data obtained from “smart” 
appliances in criminal investigations). 
 2 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (“[W]e perceive no 
legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ in their [banking record’s] contents . . . . This 
Court has repeatedly held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the 
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to 
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that 
it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third 
party will not be betrayed.”) (citations omitted). 
 3 This Recent Development uses the term “personal technology” as a shorthand 
for the wide array of consumer electronic devices that send or receive signals and 
the programs on these devices, such as internet browsers and applications. Rather 
than provide an exhaustive list of connected consumer devices, the services that 
power them, and the applications they contain, the term “personal technology” is 
intended to encompass both older technologies (such as cell phones and 
computers), newer technologies (such as Internet of Things devices), and future 
connected consumer technologies, along with data-generating programs on these 
devices. For a discussion of Internet of Things devices, see Adam D. Thierer, The 
Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy and Security 
Concerns Without Derailing Innovation, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. 6, 2015, at 1, 
4–17; see also Ian Bogost, Amazon Is Invading Your Home with Micro-
Convenience, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 21, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/09/amazon-is-invading-
your-home-with-micro-convenience/571015/ (discussing Amazon’s developing 
line of Alexa-compatible smart home appliances). 
 4 See, e.g., Steven M. Bellovin et al., It’s Too Complicated: How the Internet 
Upends Katz, Smith, and Electronic Surveillance Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 
54 (2016) (“New technologies challenge many of the basic assumptions 
underlying such principles as the third-party doctrine. Specifically, there may be 
no way for a user to know or even discover what kind of information she shares 
with third parties, many of whom are invisible to her. Similarly, traditional models 
of what constitutes content and what might be considered mere transactional, non-
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In Carpenter v. United States,5 the United States Supreme Court 
issued a landmark decision for technology and privacy, as the Court 
reconsidered the third-party doctrine in light of technological 
developments.6 The technology at issue in Carpenter was cell-site 
location information (CSLI), a form of data generated by cell phones 
and held by telecommunications companies.7 When a cell phone 
connects to a cell tower, the connection is time-stamped and 
recorded, creating a detailed record of the cell phone user’s 
movements.8 Given the increased capabilities of cell phones, and the 
expanded networks of cell towers used to power them, CSLI 
provides detailed, location-based information on any consumer 
carrying a cell phone.9 Any cell phone generates CSLI when it 
receives or sends a call or text message,10 and smartphones generate 
CSLI “several times a minute whenever their signal is on,”11 even 
when the consumer is not actively using the smartphone.12 
Although the majority opinion discussed both the 
conceptualization of reasonable expectations of privacy in the 
                                                 
content information often yield nonsensical, indeterminate, or unsatisfying results 
when applied to modern technologies.”). But see Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the 
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 580–81 (2009) (“Just as the Fourth 
Amendment should protect that which technology exposes, so should the Fourth 
Amendment permit access to that which technology hides. From this perspective, 
the third-party doctrine is needed to ensure the technology neutrality of the Fourth 
Amendment. It ensures that we have the same rough degree of Fourth Amendment 
protection independently of whether wrongdoers use third-party agents to 
facilitate their crimes.”). 
 5 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 6 Id. at 2214–15 (“This sort of digital data—personal location information 
maintained by a third party—does not fit neatly under existing precedents. 
Instead, requests for cell-site records lie at the intersection of two lines of cases, 
both of which inform our understanding of the privacy interests at stake.”). 
 7 See id. at 2211–12 (discussing the technology behind CSLI). 
 8 See id. 
 9 See id. 
 10 Robert M. Bloom & William T. Clark, Small Cells, Big Problems: The 
Increasing Precision of Cell Site Location Information and the Need for Fourth 
Amendment Protections, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 167, 172–73 (2016). 
 11 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211. 
 12 See id. at 2211–12. 
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digital age13 and the limitations of the third-party doctrine,14 this 
Recent Development focuses primarily on the third-party doctrine 
aspects of the majority’s opinion. The majority’s decision to limit 
the third-party doctrine by protecting CSLI from warrantless 
searches15 could drastically alter the future of consumer data 
privacy. By reading Carpenter alongside Justice Sotomayor’s 
concurrence in United States v. Jones,16 courts in future cases should 
find that other forms of aggregated data generated by personal 
technology and held by third party companies are similarly 
protected from warrantless searches. Alternatively, the majority’s 
opinion could be construed narrowly,17 representing a missed 
opportunity for enhanced protection of sensitive aggregated 
consumer data in the digital age. 
After providing a brief overview of how CSLI technology 
records consumer data and discussing newer technology that 
presents additional problems in Section II, this Recent Development 
reviews the major cases leading up to Carpenter in Section III, and 
provides an analysis of the Carpenter majority holding and Justice 
Kennedy’s dissent in Section IV. Finally, this Recent Development 
recommends in Section V that courts read Carpenter alongside 
Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence to establish a framework for 
greater Fourth Amendment protection of consumer data held by 
third-party businesses before contrasting this approach with one 
based on reading Carpenter alone. 
II.  TECHNOLOGY BACKGROUND 
Although the widespread use of cell phones makes CSLI 
especially concerning,18 other forms of consumer data held by third 
parties may be equally, or more, sensitive. Comparing CSLI with 
other forms of aggregated consumer data generated on personal 
                                                 
 13 See id. at 2215. 
 14 See id. at 2216. 
 15 See id. at 2223. 
 16 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 17 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (“Our decision today is a narrow one. We 
do not express a view on matters not before us.”). 
 18 See id. at 2211 (noting that while the United States has a population of 326 
million, the nation is home to 396 million cellular service accounts). 
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technology reveals that CSLI is merely one example out of the 
myriad forms of sensitive consumer data held by businesses. 
Internet of Things (IoT) or “smart” devices, defined as objects with 
networked sensors that can communicate amongst themselves, 
present unprecedented opportunities for mass data collection from 
everyday objects.19 Although the Court’s decision to protect CSLI 
from warrantless searches represents a positive first step for 
consumer privacy protection, aggregated consumer data generated 
through other personal technologies is equally deserving of Fourth 
Amendment protection. 
A. What is CSLI and How Does It Work? 
Cellular networks are supported by cell towers, which are 
arranged in a hexagonal pattern typically featuring three antennas 
that provide cell coverage to a circular area surrounding the tower.20 
When a cell phone connects to a tower, the consumer’s telephone 
number and the product number of the consumer’s cell phone are 
recorded along with the time; CSLI describes this set of data.21 
Although a traditional cell tower in an urban area provides coverage 
within a radius ranging from half a mile to two miles surrounding 
the tower, the precise antenna that provides the connection is 
recorded.22 Thereby, the consumer’s location is traceable to one 
specific wedge within the cell tower’s coverage area.23 Depending 
on the size of the cell tower’s radius and the number of antennas, 
this places the user in an area ranging from one-eighth to four square 
miles.24 Because smartphones rely on internet connections to power 
a host of applications, even when not in active use,25 “[v]irtually any 
                                                 
 19 See Dalmacio V. Posadas, Jr., After the Gold Rush: The Boom of the Internet 
of Things, and the Busts of Data-Security and Privacy, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 69, 75–78 (2017) (describing IoT devices, such as 
driverless cars, “smart” pill bottles, and wearable devices, while warning that 
these technologies gather and analyze vast quantities of consumer data, often with 
few security protections designed to thwart hackers). 
 20 See Bloom & Clark, supra note 10, at 172. 
 21 See id. at 172–73. 
 22 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2225 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 23 Id. at 2218 (majority opinion). 
 24 See id. 
 25 Id. at 2211–12. 
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activity on the phone generates CSLI, including incoming calls, 
texts, or e-mails and countless other data connections that a phone 
automatically makes when checking for news, weather, or social 
media updates.”26 
The telecommunications company that owns the cell tower 
stores the CSLI data for up to five years,27 and frequently sells 
aggregated CSLI data to third-parties as part of a market worth 
billions of dollars.28 To illustrate this point, major cell service 
providers have contracts with data aggregators that can allow 
consumers to receive virtual coupons from nearby businesses or 
receive roadside assistance.29 In addition to marketing ploys, these 
contracts allow data aggregators to market real-time CSLI tracking 
services to law enforcement agencies.30 
The Carpenter case illustrates one of the problems with taking a 
haphazard approach to developing technologies: by the time a case 
reaches the Supreme Court, the underlying technology has been 
refined to the point of presenting different questions than the 
technology at issue in the case.31 The CSLI data used to convict 
                                                 
 26 Id. at 2220. 
 27 See id. at 2218. 
 28 See id. at 2225 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“This data can be used, for example, 
to help a department store determine which of various prospective store locations 
is likely to get more foot traffic from middle-aged women who live in affluent zip 
codes.”). 
 29 See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Service Meant to Monitor Inmates’ Calls 
Could Track You, Too, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/10/technology/cellphone-tracking-law-
enforcement.html?module=inline. 
 30 See id. (describing Securus Technologies, a data broker that used a location 
aggregator stocked with CSLI records from AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, and 
Verizon to sell real-time tracking services to law enforcement); see also Jennifer 
Valentino-DeVries, Largest Cell Phone Carriers to Limit Sales of Location Data, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/ 
technology/verizon-att-cellphone-tracking.html (describing promises by major 
cell service providers to reform CSLI marketing practices in response to public 
outcry regarding location aggregators). 
 31 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 (“While the records in this case reflect the 
state of technology at the start of the decade, the accuracy of CSLI is rapidly 
approaching GPS-level precision.”). 
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Carpenter was generated in 2011,32 and cell tower technology has 
developed significantly since then.33 As the majority in Carpenter 
noted: “[w]hile the records in this case reflect the state of technology 
at the start of the decade, the accuracy of CSLI is rapidly 
approaching GPS-level precision . . . wireless carriers have the 
capability to pinpoint a phone’s location within 50 meters.”34 This 
increased precision is due primarily to the use of “small cell” 
technology, which refers to a variety of small-scale cell tower 
locations that supplement networks of traditional cell towers.35 
Small cells can be installed in homes with poor coverage, in public 
spaces that have high demand for coverage in a relatively compact 
area (such as stadiums), or on lampposts in densely-populated urban 
areas.36 
Given the enthusiasm with which urban areas have been 
installing, or developing plans to install, small-cell technologies,37 
some estimates state that CSLI generated from a small-cell location 
could accurately record consumer location to within ten feet.38 This 
ten-foot area is significantly more alarming than the one-eighth of a 
mile to four square mile area generated by traditional cell towers, 
and represents location-tracking capabilities that can match or 
surpass those of GPS devices.39 This demonstrates the inherent 
problems with an unstructured approach to protecting data generated 
by new technology: without a predictable framework, the 
                                                 
 32 See id. at 2212. 
 33 See id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Bloom & Clark, supra note 10, at 174 (“Small cells are miniature base 
stations that provide a small range of cellular signal in areas that are either 
overburdened or underserved by traditional cell networks.”). 
 36 Id. at 174–75. 
 37 See Allan Holmes, 5G Cell Service Is Coming. Who Decides Where It Goes?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/technology/ 
5g-cellular-service.html (describing plans to place small-cells 500 feet apart in 
urban areas in order to facilitate 5G network coverage). 
 38 Bloom & Clark, supra note 10, at 176. 
 39 Id. (explaining that although GPS technology can track location to within 
fifty feet, small-cell systems could lead to CSLI that is accurate to within ten feet 
or less). 
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technology at issue in the case becomes outdated, perhaps even 
obsolete, before the case reaches the Supreme Court. 
B. New Technologies Present New Challenges for Privacy 
Protection 
Although CSLI is an undoubtedly powerful type of data that 
deserves protection from warrantless search, it is merely one form 
of data generated on personal technology that presents challenges to 
traditional applications of the third-party doctrine. Indeed, given the 
ever-increasing capabilities of smartphones, CSLI may not even be 
the most sensitive data collected from cellular devices.40 The host of 
“sensors, accelerometers, cameras, microphones, and other 
capabilities that can be used to collect and transmit various types of 
user information”41 that come standard on modern smartphones 
means that CSLI is merely one of many types of sensitive data 
generated from smartphones.42 Additionally, the capability of 
smartphones to connect with “smart” devices threatens to expose 
ever-increasing aspects of everyday life to collection by third-party 
businesses, and, thus, law enforcement.43 
Internet of Things (IoT), or “smart” devices, can be broadly 
defined as objects with sensors that communicate amongst 
themselves via the internet.44 These devices rely on embedded 
computer chips to generate data, which is then shared with other 
“smart” devices by using Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cell phone networks, or 
other means of connection to access the internet.45 By connecting to 
a plethora of everyday objects, IoT devices have the potential to 
create “an almost inescapable data web that monitors many aspects 
of one’s life.”46 For example, smart utility meters can monitor water 
                                                 
 40 See Thierer, supra note 3, at 21. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See id. 
 43 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth 
Amendment of Effects, 104 CAL. L. REV. 805, 807 (2016) (“Today, with the advent 
of the ‘Internet of Things,’ objects in your house, car, office, and smartphone 
communicate, interact, report, track, and provide vast amounts of data about the 
activities of their owners.”). 
 44 See Posadas, supra note 19, at 75. 
 45 See id. at 76–77. 
 46 Ferguson, supra note 43, at 819. 
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or electricity usage by the hour and compare that usage with past 
trends.47 One utility company reported receiving subpoenas from 
law enforcement for the smart meter data of 480 customers in 
2017.48 Smart refrigerators can track food consumption, reordering 
items as they are used, while smart mattresses can monitor sleep 
patterns.49 Amazon has recently unveiled a line of everyday devices, 
including analog wall clocks and microwaves, that are responsive to 
voice commands through Alexa, the company’s virtual voice 
assistant.50 Additionally, the insurance company, John Hancock, has 
announced plans to encourage life-insurance policyholders to wear 
fitness tracking devices in exchange for policy discounts.51 
The rapid expansion of connected IoT devices52 highlights the 
importance of establishing a predictable framework for protecting 
data held by third-parties from warrantless search, as data generated 
by IoT devices could dwarf that generated by CSLI.53 Rather than 
leaving lower courts without guidance regarding how to evaluate 
each individual IoT device, the Supreme Court should adopt a 
comprehensive interpretive stance that provides predictable 
protection for data generated by these technologies. 
                                                 
 47 See Zwerdling, supra note 1. 
 48 See id. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See Bogost, supra note 3. 
 51 See id.; see also Angela Chen, What Happens When Life Insurance 
Companies Track Fitness Data?, THE VERGE (Sept. 26, 2018, 1:01 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/26/17905390/john-hancock-life-insurance-
fitness-tracker-wearables-science-health. 
 52 See Thierer, supra note 3, at 12 (citing estimates that approximately 30 billion 
IoT devices will be in use by 2020); see also Peter Newman, There Will be More 
Than 55 Billion IoT Devices by 2025 — These Are the Biggest Drivers for 
Adoption, BUS. INSIDER (July 27, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/ 
internet-of-things-report (estimating that 55 billion IoT devices will be in use by 
2025, up from 9 billion in 2017). 
 53 See Ferguson, supra note 43, at 820 (“Knowing that you called a certain 
number (cell data), drove to a certain house (drone or camera), and repeated that 
trip every week (GPS) pales in comparison to knowing those facts plus the time 
the bedroom light comes on in that house (through NEST systems), the elevated 
heartbeat in that bedroom (through health monitors), and the opening of a 
particular enchanted pill bottle (smart pill bottles)—all of which might provide a 
much better clue about the nature of your business at the house.”). 
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III.  BACKGROUND LAW: WHERE DATA PROTECTION HAS BEEN 
AND WHERE IT IS GOING 
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States54 
established the “reasonable expectations of privacy” test for 
determining if law enforcement conducted a search that required a 
warrant under the Fourth Amendment.55 However, the Supreme 
Court later revised this test to exclude business records from Fourth 
Amendment protection in United States v. Miller,56 which 
established the third-party doctrine as a limitation on Katz.57 Smith 
v. Maryland58 then applied the third-party doctrine to data generated 
by pen registers, which record dialed telephone numbers.59 More 
recently, a majority of Supreme Court Justices in United States v. 
Jones60 recognized that individuals may have a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” in their aggregated movements, but deferred 
answering this question.61 In her Jones concurrence, meanwhile, 
Justice Sotomayor recommended granting Fourth Amendment 
protection to aggregated movements and questioned the continued 
appropriateness of the third-party doctrine.62 The specific facts of 
each case provide clues both to the issues that concerned the 
Supreme Court in Carpenter and to the types of privacy issues that 
may concern the Court in the future. The Court’s comparison of 
CSLI to outdated technology also demonstrates the flaws of a 
haphazard approach to determining the scope of Fourth Amendment 
protections: comparing recent technology to that in use forty or fifty 
years ago is an inherently confounding exercise.63 
                                                 
 54 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 55 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 56 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 57 Id. at 442–43. 
 58 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 59 Id. at 744–45. 
 60 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 61 Id. at 412. 
 62 Id. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 63 See Bellovin et al., supra note 4, at 54. 
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A. Katz v. United States Establishes Expectations of Privacy 
Standard 
Although this Recent Development focuses on the third-party 
doctrine aspects of the Carpenter decision, Katz figured so 
prominently in the Court’s opinion that some discussion is 
necessary. Katz recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects an 
individual’s reasonable expectations of privacy and is not strictly 
property-based.64 Hence, the Carpenter court had to determine first 
whether Carpenter had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
general movements,65 and second, whether this expectation was 
precluded because Carpenter allowed a third-party business to 
collect and retain his location information.66 
At issue in Katz was the FBI’s warrantless attachment of a 
listening and recording device to the exterior of a phone booth used 
by the defendant to transfer illegal gambling information.67 Because 
the device was attached to the exterior of the phone booth, the 
government argued no search had occurred under the Fourth 
Amendment.68 This argument hinged on the traditional approach 
that considered physical intrusion necessary to trigger Fourth 
Amendment protection.69 In rejecting this argument, the Court 
decoupled physical intrusion and searches requiring a warrant: 
“once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people – 
and not simply ‘areas’ – against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon 
the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given 
enclosure.”70 Because “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places,”71 the Court looked to see whether Katz’s expectations when 
using the phone booth rendered his conversation protected, and 
                                                 
 64 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (citing Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). 
 65 See id. at 2215 (citation omitted). 
 66 See id. at 2216 (citing Smith v. United States, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); 
Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)). 
 67 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
 68 Id. at 352–53. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 353. 
 71 Id. at 351. 
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concluded that he acted within the scope of Fourth Amendment 
protection.72 Justice Harlan’s concurrence reasoned that to establish 
Fourth Amendment protection under this new “people, not places” 
inquiry, the defendant must have a subjective expectation of privacy 
and “the expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”73 Justice Harlan’s formulation was 
quickly adopted as the test for determining the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protection post-Katz, and remains so today.74 However, 
scholars have criticized Katz for beginning an interpretive regime 
that lacks clarity and encourages idiosyncratic judicial 
interpretations.75 The third-party doctrine represents a flaw in the 
Katz interpretive system, serving as a somewhat arbitrary limitation 
on what an individual’s “reasonable expectations of privacy” may 
be.76 
B. United States v. Miller Establishes the Third-Party Doctrine 
The third-party doctrine, which allows law enforcement to 
access business records without a warrant, was established in 
Miller.77 During an investigation of Miller’s illegal distillery, law 
enforcement subpoenaed Miller’s financial records from two 
banks.78 Investigators viewed microfilm copies of Miller’s account 
and received copies of a deposit slip and checks from one bank, and 
                                                 
 72 Id. at 352 (“No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend’s 
apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it . . . is surely entitled 
to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the 
world.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 73 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 74 Luke M. Milligan, The Real Rules of “Search” Interpretations, 21 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 18 (2012). 
 75 See id. at 23–28 (describing scholarly criticism of the Katz approach). 
 76 See Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1403 (2004) (“The conclusion that Miller, Smith, and like 
cases foreclose any claim of an expectation of privacy in communications held by 
a service provider fails to acknowledge . . . the doctrinal and normative 
underpinnings of those decisions. A broad reading of Miller and Smith is also 
fundamentally inconsistent with Katz.”). 
 77 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (“This third-party 
doctrine largely traces its roots to Miller.”). 
 78 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976). 
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viewed microfilm copies and received copies of checks, deposit 
slips, financial statements, and monthly statements from the second 
bank.79 Evaluating Miller’s claim that accessing the documents 
constituted an unreasonable search, the Court held that the banking 
records were neither his “private papers,”80 nor were they protected 
under Katz.81 
In declining to extend Katz to protect Miller’s banking records, 
the Supreme Court cited the Katz’s assertion that public information 
falls outside the scope of Fourth Amendment protection.82 The Court 
appeared likely to take a subjective approach when it explained that 
“[w]e must examine the nature of the particular documents sought 
to be protected in order to determine whether there is a legitimate 
‘expectation of privacy’ concerning their contents.”83 The Court 
then reasoned that when Miller voluntarily disclosed the information 
contained in his bank records to a business, he assumed the risk that 
the business would disclose this information to the government.84 
After finding no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding 
Miller’s banking records, the Court’s opinion denied protection for 
business records generally, stating: 
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and 
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is 
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose 
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.85 
This unnecessarily restrictive approach to Katz fails to recognize 
both the varying degrees of sensitive information contained in 
business records and the varying degrees of trust a consumer may 
                                                 
 79 Id. at 438. 
 80 Id. at 440–41 (finding that defendant did not have a property interest in the 
records because they belonged to, and were controlled by, the banks). 
 81 Id. at 442–43. 
 82 Id. at 442 (“But in Katz the Court also stressed that ‘[w]hat a person 
knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.’”) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). 
 83 Id. (citing Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973)). 
 84 Id. at 442–43. 
 85 Id. at 443 (citations omitted). 
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have in different businesses.86 Accordingly, the third-party doctrine 
as established in Miller serves as a categorical limitation on Katz, as 
individuals are considered to lack any reasonable expectation of 
privacy in business records held by third parties, even when those 
records contain sensitive personal data.87 
C. Smith v. Maryland Affirms the Third-Party Doctrine 
Smith involved a pen register, installed by a telephone company 
at the request of the police, to monitor outgoing calls from the 
defendant’s telephone.88 A pen register is a device that collects and 
stores the telephone numbers a customer dials, and operates from 
equipment located at the telephone company’s offices.89 A pen 
register therefore does not represent a property-based intrusion, and 
does not acquire the content of the telephone conversation that 
occurs after it records the dialed telephone number.90 By recording 
the telephone numbers of Smith’s outgoing calls, the pen register 
showed that Smith, who was suspected of stalking, had dialed the 
victim’s number from his home telephone.91 
The Court used the two-part test from Katz to evaluate Smith’s 
claim that the pen register constituted a search requiring a warrant.92 
The Court first explained that Smith lacked any reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, since the fact 
that phone companies collect and store this information was 
                                                 
 86 See Bellia, supra note 76, at 1402 (“Read broadly, Miller suggests that the 
mere fact that documents are conveyed to a third party, without regard to the type 
of documents at issue or the purpose for which the documents were provided, 
eliminates any expectation of privacy.”). 
 87 See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 528–
29 (2006) (citing Miller and Smith as the leading third-party doctrine cases while 
noting that the third-party doctrine excludes significant amounts of information 
from Fourth Amendment protection in the digital age). 
 88 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). 
 89 Id. at 741. 
 90 Id. (“Yet a pen register differs significantly from the listening device 
employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents of 
communications.”); see also Bellovin et al., supra note 4, at 54 (explaining the 
protected content versus unprotected non-content distinction while arguing that 
this distinction is rendered irrelevant by modern technology). 
 91 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. 
 92 Id. at 740–41. 
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considered common knowledge.93 In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court attributed to all telephone users the knowledge that dialed 
telephone numbers are sent through the telephone company’s 
equipment and recorded for billing purposes.94 After making this 
somewhat unconvincing analysis, the Court argued that “[a]lthough 
most people may be oblivious to a pen register’s esoteric functions, 
they presumably have some awareness of one common use: to aid 
in the identification of persons making annoying or obscene calls.”95 
Thus, the Court’s assertion that any consumer knows telephone 
companies receive and store dialed telephone numbers served to 
prevent a reasonable expectation of privacy from forming, despite 
the fact that Smith made the calls from his home telephone.96 
Second, the Court reasoned that even if Smith had a subjective 
expectation that the numbers he dialed would remain private, this 
expectation was not “one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable,’”97 because “[t]his Court consistently has held that a 
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he 
voluntarily turns over to third parties.”98 Under the Court’s logic, 
voluntary activities that expose user information to third-party 
businesses create an assumed risk that this information will be 
passed along to law enforcement.99 Smith, then, solidified Miller’s 
assertion that Katz does not extend its protections to third-party 
business records as a class. 
D. United States v. Jones Questions the Third-Party Doctrine 
The third-party doctrine as described in the 1970s by Miller and 
Smith has received scholarly criticism due to the explosion of 
personal technology, as the volume and content of data generated by 
                                                 
 93 See id. at 742–43. 
 94 See id. at 742. 
 95 Id. (citations omitted). 
 96 Id. at 743 (“The fact that [Smith] dialed the number on his home phone rather 
than on some other phone could make no conceivable difference, nor could any 
subscriber rationally think it would.”). 
 97 Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). 
 98 Id. at 743–44 (citations omitted). 
 99 See id. at 744–45. 
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users and held by businesses has expanded exponentially.100 United 
States v. Jones served as the precursor to Carpenter’s limitation of 
the third-party doctrine both by leaving open the possibility of a 
right to privacy in one’s general movements,101 and by Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurring opinion, which questioned the continued 
applicability of the third-party doctrine in the digital age.102 
At issue in Jones was law enforcement’s attachment of a GPS 
tracker to a vehicle used by Jones and registered to his wife.103 
Although law enforcement obtained a warrant to place the device on 
the vehicle, it was installed after the warrant expired and outside of 
the jurisdiction where the warrant was issued.104 The GPS showed 
the location of Jones’ vehicle from within 50 to 100 feet, and relayed 
more than 2,000 pages of data over a one-month period.105 The 
majority concluded that law enforcement had violated Jones’ Fourth 
Amendment protections by committing a physical trespass on his 
vehicle.106 In doing so, the majority relied on the older, property-
based standard of Fourth Amendment protection.107 However, the 
majority noted the possibility that “achieving the same result 
through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an 
                                                 
 100 See Bellovin et al., supra note 4, at 54. 
 101 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012) (“It may be that 
achieving the same result [surveilling Jones for four weeks] through electronic 
means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of 
privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer that question.”). 
 102 Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider 
the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the 
digital age, in which people reveal a great deal about themselves to third parties 
in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”) (citations omitted). 
 103 See id. at 402–03 (majority opinion). 
 104 See id. 
 105 Id. at 403. 
 106 Id. at 404 (“It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The 
Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining 
information.”); see also id. at 410 (“By attaching the device to the Jeep, officers 
encroached on a protected area.”). 
 107 See Milligan, supra note 74, at 23 (explaining that Jones expanded the 
importance of property in determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation 
occurred by making property intrusions a “sufficient condition” for a search). 
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unconstitutional invasion of privacy,”108 but deferred answering that 
question.109 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence provided a more feasible 
framework for protecting information generated by personal devices 
that does not hinge on physical intrusion while also calling into 
question the continued use of the third-party doctrine.110 Justice 
Sotomayor began by noting that “[t]he Government usurped Jones’ 
property for the purpose of conducting surveillance on him, thereby 
invading privacy interests long afforded, and undoubtedly entitled 
to, Fourth Amendment protection.”111 Although the appropriation of 
Jones’ property was conducted through physically attaching a GPS 
device, Justice Sotomayor explained that focusing on physical 
intrusion is increasingly irrelevant due to tracking capabilities 
embedded in consumer devices.112 
Justice Sotomayor then noted the uniquely sensitive information 
that precise GPS monitoring may reveal, as GPS data creates a 
“comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects 
a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, 
religious, and sexual associations.”113 The cost efficiency and 
potential secrecy of GPS monitoring are additional causes for 
concern,114 as is the chilling effect such surveillance may have, since 
“[a]wareness that the Government may be watching chills 
associational and expressive freedoms.”115 The concerns arising 
from GPS surveillance led Justice Sotomayor to argue that there 
exists a “reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of 
                                                 
 108 Jones, 565 U.S. at 412. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 111 Id. at 413–14 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511–12 
(1961)). 
 112 Id. at 415 (“With increasing regularity, the Government will be capable of 
duplicating the monitoring undertaken in this case by enlisting factory- or owner-
installed vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones.”) (citing United 
States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)). 
 113 Id. (citation omitted). 
 114 See id. at 415–16 (citation omitted). 
 115 See id. at 416. 
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one’s public movements.”116 Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, 
therefore, emphasized that the government should not be permitted 
to easily collect aggregated data that reveals sensitive personal 
characteristics and beliefs.117 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence concluded by questioning the 
continued relevance of the third-party doctrine in the digital age, 
given the broad scope of information individuals reveal to third 
parties “in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”118 The 
information these “mundane tasks” place at risk of disclosure 
includes telephone numbers, websites, e-mail addresses, and items 
purchased online.119 Justice Sotomayor also noted that societal 
expectations “can attain constitutionally protected status only if our 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a 
prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that all information 
voluntarily disclosed . . . is, for that reason alone, disentitled to 
Fourth Amendment protection.”120 Thus, under Justice Sotomayor’s 
framework, the government may not coopt personal technology to 
replace traditional surveillance methods simply because third-
parties have access to this sensitive, aggregated information. 
IV.  CARPENTER OPINION 
Based on the sensitivity of aggregated location data that CSLI 
discloses,121 and the inability to disable the collection of CSLI when 
using a cell phone,122 the Carpenter majority held that law 
enforcement conducted a Fourth Amendment search requiring a 
warrant when officers accessed CSLI data revealing Carpenter’s 
historic location information.123 Although the majority’s decision to 
not extend the third-party doctrine represents a major step forward 
for data privacy, the majority is unclear about the scope of the third-
                                                 
 116 Id. 
 117 See id. 
 118 Id. at 417. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 418 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting)). 
 121 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214–15 (2018). 
 122 See id. at 2223. 
 123 Id. at 2212, 2220. 
20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. [VOL. 20: 1 
party doctrine after Carpenter and provides little guidance about 
how to approach new technology in the future.124 
A. The Majority Opinion Has Potential for Predictable 
Protections, but Risks a Haphazard Approach 
In 2011, law enforcement officers accessed CSLI records from 
Carpenter’s mobile carriers after obtaining court orders under the 
Stored Communications Act,125 which allows law enforcement to 
access telecommunications records by showing “‘reasonable 
grounds to believe’ that the records sought ‘are relevant and material 
to an ongoing criminal investigation.’”126 This is a lower standard 
than that required to obtain a warrant, which requires “probable 
cause.”127 Consequently, although law enforcement was required to 
obtain a court’s approval to access Carpenter’s CSLI, the statutory 
standard of proof was easier to meet than that required to obtain a 
search warrant under the Fourth Amendment.128 Officers obtained 
129 days’ worth of CSLI from Carpenter’s two mobile carriers, 
totaling 12,898 location points.129 This information was used at trial 
to place Carpenter near four of the robberies for which he was 
charged and convicted.130 The CSLI was mentioned in the 
prosecutor’s closing argument, and Carpenter received a prison 
sentence of over one hundred years.131 
In holding that law enforcement improperly used CSLI to 
convict Carpenter,132 the majority opinion relied on two separate, but 
related, lines of cases. In the first line of cases, the Court discussed 
the notion that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
                                                 
 124 See id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court fails ‘to provide clear 
guidance to law enforcement’ and courts on key issues raised by its 
reinterpretation of Miller and Smith.”) (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 
2491 (2014))). 
 125 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2018). 
 126 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2018)). 
 127 See id. 
 128 See id. 
 129 See id. at 2212–13. 
 130 See id. 
 131 See id. at 2213. 
 132 Id. at 2220 (“The Government’s acquisition of the cell-site records was a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
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in their locations, relying largely on Justice Sotomayor’s and Justice 
Alito’s concurrences from Jones.133 For the second line of cases, the 
Court considered whether the third-party doctrine precluded 
Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his aggregated 
location information, since this data was readily available to 
Carpenter’s wireless carriers.134 For both issues, the Court concluded 
that, “[w]hether the Government employs its own surveillance 
technology as in Jones or leverages the technology of a wireless 
carrier, we hold that an individual maintains a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured 
through CSLI.”135 Although the majority exempted CSLI from the 
third-party doctrine,136 representing a significant step forward for 
consumer privacy rights, the opinion is unclear about how, or 
whether, to extend Fourth Amendment protection to other 
technologies that reveal detailed personal information. 
A thorough analysis of the language the majority used to 
describe CSLI provides some clues as to the source of the perceived 
differences between CSLI and other types of third-party business 
records, such as those at issue in Miller and Smith. The majority 
described CSLI as: “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly 
compiled”;137 a “qualitatively different category”138 than bank 
records and telephone numbers;139 “conveying . . . a detailed and 
comprehensive record of the person’s movements”;140 “remarkably 
easy, cheap, and efficient compared to traditional investigative 
tools”;141 a form of “tireless and absolute surveillance”;142 “a detailed 
chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled every day, every 
moment, over several years”;143 “not truly ‘shared’ as one normally 
                                                 
 133 See id. at 2215. 
 134 See id. at 2216. 
 135 Id. at 2217. 
 136 See id. (“We decline to extend Smith and Miller to cover these novel 
circumstances.”). 
 137 Id. at 2216. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 2217. 
 141 Id. at 2218. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 2220. 
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understands the term”;144 and “an entirely different species of 
business record”145 before concluding that “the deeply revealing 
nature of CSLI, its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the 
inescapable and automatic nature of its collection”146 render CSLI 
outside the scope of the third-party doctrine.147 Although the Court 
used this collection of epithets to describe CSLI, it is unclear 
whether a different technology must meet all of these descriptions 
in order to be protected. Is this a list of necessary conditions that 
must be met before data from a different technology receives Fourth 
Amendment protection? Or is some minimum amount of these 
attributes sufficient to grant protection to non-CSLI data? By not 
answering these questions, the Court risks implementing a scattered 
approach to extending Fourth Amendment protections to new 
technologies. 
The majority appeared to use a balancing test (without calling it 
such)148 to determine that, because individuals have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy regarding their historical location 
information, and because CSLI collects this information 
automatically from a ubiquitous device, CSLI is therefore protected 
from warrantless search.149 The majority then declined to consider 
any broader application than historical CSLI, leaving unclear how, 
or whether, to apply this logic to future technologies.150 Rather, the 
                                                 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 2222. 
 146 Id. at 2223. 
 147 See id. 
 148 Id. at 2231–32 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Court appears, in my 
respectful view, to read Miller and Smith to establish a balancing test. For each 
‘qualitatively different category’ of information, the Court suggests, the privacy 
interests at stake must be weighed against the fact that the information has been 
disclosed to a third party.”) (citing majority opinion at 2216, 2219–20). 
 149 See id. at 2220 (majority opinion) (explaining that CSLI is not voluntarily 
disclosed, in part due to the necessity of cell phones to modern life and the 
inability to disable CSLI collection). 
 150 Id. (“Our decision today is a narrow one. We do not express a view on 
matters not before us: real-time CSLI or ‘tower dumps’ (a download of 
information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a 
particular interval). We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call 
into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security 
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Court restricted its holding to historical CSLI gathered over more 
than six days.151 The Court did leave a small aperture to potentially 
allow for future expansion of its holding by briefly stating, “[w]e 
hold only that a warrant is required in the rare case where the suspect 
has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party,”152 
but did not explain how to evaluate whether such a situation has 
occurred. By declining to address future applications of its holding, 
the Court risks implementing a haphazard approach to protecting 
new technologies that will draw arbitrary distinctions between types 
of data based on idiosyncratic analogies. Without a clear directive 
on the status of the third-party doctrine after Carpenter, “the Court 
fails ‘to provide clear guidance to law enforcement’ and courts on 
key issues raised by its reinterpretation of Miller and Smith.”153 
B. Justice Kennedy’s Dissent Presents the Risks and 
Inconsistencies in the Majority’s Approach 
Justice Kennedy’s dissent provided a defense of the third-party 
doctrine154 and highlighted the risks and uncertainties of the 
majority’s approach.155 Justice Kennedy argued that “Miller and 
Smith set forth an important and necessary limitation on the Katz 
framework. They rest upon the commonsense principle that the 
absence of property law analogues can be dispositive of privacy 
expectations.”156 In Justice Kennedy’s view, consumers have no 
property interest in business records and, therefore, lack any 
reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz.157 In justifying the 
                                                 
cameras. Nor do we address other business records that might incidentally reveal 
location information.”). 
 151 See id. at 2224 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“According to today’s majority 
opinion, the Government can acquire a record of every credit card purchase and 
phone call a person makes over months or years without upsetting a legitimate 
expectation of privacy. But, in the Court’s view, the Government crosses a 
constitutional line when it obtains a court’s approval to issue a subpoena for more 
than six days of cell-site records . . . .”). 
 152 Id. at 2222 (majority opinion). 
 153 Id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 
2473, 2491 (2014)). 
 154 See id. at 2226–28. 
 155 See id. at 2234. 
 156 Id. at 2228. 
 157 See id. 
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third-party doctrine, Justice Kennedy focused on the lack of 
consumer control over CSLI once it is collected by the service 
provider and attributed knowledge of the commercial value and use 
of this data to consumers.158 Similarly to the majority opinions in 
Miller and Smith, this approach makes questionable assumptions 
about the extent of consumer knowledge regarding data collection159 
and refuses to recognize the varied expectations a consumer may 
have when interacting with different businesses.160 Justice Kennedy 
also argued that compelled disclosure of business records serves as 
a useful and legitimate resource for law enforcement while affording 
adequate protections to businesses, which release the data without 
physical government intrusion and may object to this compelled 
disclosure.161 
After defending the third-party doctrine, Justice Kennedy 
discussed the flaws inherent in the Court’s new, third-party 
balancing test: “[f]or each ‘qualitatively different category’ of 
information, the Court suggests, the privacy interests at stake must 
be weighed against the fact that the information has been disclosed 
to a third party . . . That is an untenable reading of Miller and 
Smith.”162 In Justice Kennedy’s view, this approach arbitrarily 
                                                 
 158 See id. at 2230 (“Because Carpenter lacks a requisite connection to the cell-
site records, he also may not claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in them. 
He could expect that a third party—the cell service provider—could use the 
information it collected, stored, and classified as its own for a variety of business 
and commercial purposes.”). 
 159 See Bellovin et al., supra note 4, at 54 (discussing the difficulty of knowing 
what information a consumer may disclose by using technology in the digital age). 
 160 See Bellia, supra note 76, at 1403 (“There are at least four differences that 
are relevant to an assessment of an expectation of privacy: (1) the type of 
information at issue; (2) the individual’s purpose in placing information in the 
hands of the third party; (3) the relevance of the substance of the information to 
the third party’s activities; and (4) the limitations on the third party’s ability to 
gain access to or use the substance of the information.”). 
 161 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2228–29 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also 
Alan Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 112–122 
(2018) (arguing that technology companies may serve as “surveillance 
intermediaries” by resisting governmental efforts to access the consumer data they 
hold). 
 162 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2231–32 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing majority 
opinion at 2216, 2219–20). 
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exempts CSLI from the third-party doctrine without convincingly 
distinguishing it from other sensitive types of data that remain 
subject to warrantless collection.163 Additionally, Justice Kennedy 
critiqued the majority for considering the increasingly-precise 
nature of CSLI in reaching its holding, arguing that “judicial 
caution, prudent in most cases, is imperative in this one,”164 before 
calling for deference to the statutory scheme in place.165 However, 
Justice Kennedy’s argument in favor of judicial caution and 
deference to legislative solutions largely ignored the historical 
cooperation between the Court and Congress in extending Fourth 
Amendment protections to new technologies.166 Indeed, it was the 
Supreme Court that first protected the content of telephone calls in 
Katz, with Congress later passing legislation to codify this 
protection.167 The Court has historically possessed an important role 
in applying the Fourth Amendment to emerging technologies and 
should continue to do so, especially when the combined 
jurisprudential and statutory approach becomes impracticable.168 
Finally, Justice Kennedy provided a list of the challenges the 
majority’s opinion poses for lower courts: the holding states that 
                                                 
 163 Id. at 2232–33 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 164 Id. at 2233. 
 165 See id. 
 166 See Bellovin et al., supra note 4, at 12–19 (describing the interaction 
between case law and statutory solutions in interpreting the Fourth Amendment); 
see also Bloom and Clark, supra note 10, at 182 (“In fact, Congress and the Court 
have often worked hand-in-hand to bring privacy protections to evolving 
technologies.”). 
 167 See Bellovin et al., supra note 4, at 12–13; see also Bloom and Clark, supra 
note 10, at 182 (“[A]fter the Court brought audio surveillance within the purview 
of the Fourth Amendment in Katz, Congress passed the Wiretap Act, which 
sought to regulate the government access to the contents of traditional phone calls. 
The Act provided for comprehensive and detailed regulations and procedures for 
wiretap orders.”). 
 168 See Bellovin et al., supra note 4, at 54 (describing the difficulties in applying 
the third-party doctrine to modern technology); see also Bloom and Clark, supra 
note 10, at 168 (“The late Justice Scalia in his 2001 majority opinion in Kyllo v. 
[United States], a case involving thermal imaging, opined that ‘while the 
technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must 
take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in 
development.’”) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001)). 
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CSLI is categorically different but “does not explain what makes 
something a distinct category of information”;169 the holding “gives 
courts and law enforcement officers no indication [of] how to 
determine whether any particular category of information falls on 
the financial-records side or the cell-site-records side of its newly 
conceived constitutional line”;170 even after information is placed on 
the CSLI side, “courts and law enforcement officers will have to 
guess how much of that information can be requested before a 
warrant is required”;171 and finally, the holding undermines widely-
used subpoena practices.172 Justice Kennedy argued that this 
amalgamation of uncertainties “will inhibit law enforcement and 
‘keep defendants and judges guessing for years to come.’”173 
Although returning to a strict application of the third-party doctrine 
represents a worse alternative than the majority’s uncertain 
approach, Justice Kennedy’s commentary speaks to the need for a 
more predictable guide to applying the Carpenter majority’s 
holding. 
V.  APPLYING CARPENTER IN FUTURE CASES: PROBLEMS AND 
SOLUTIONS 
When evaluating other types of data generated on personal 
technology and held by third-party businesses, courts should read 
Carpenter alongside Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence to 
provide a predictable system that protects sensitive consumer data 
from warrantless searches. Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence 
argued that, regardless of physical intrusion, the government should 
not coopt personal property and turn it into a means of warrantless 
surveillance.174 Although the technology at issue in Jones was GPS 
                                                 
 169 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. at 2234–35 (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014)). 
 174 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414–15 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“[P]hysical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of 
surveillance. With increasing regularity, the government will be capable of 
duplicating the monitoring undertaken in this case by enlisting factory- or owner-
installed vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones.”) (citation 
omitted). 
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tracking, this logic is applicable to other forms of sensitive data. 
Moreover, evaluating Fourth Amendment protections for the data 
generated by newer technologies, such as IoT devices, is much 
simpler, and more predictable, when reading Carpenter in 
conjunction with Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence than when 
reading Carpenter alone. 
A. Courts Should Read Carpenter in Conjunction with Justice 
Sotomayor’s Jones Concurrence 
By highlighting the flaws of a haphazard approach,175 Justice 
Kennedy’s dissent pointed to the need for a predictable, stable 
standard. Although Justice Kennedy would retain the third-party 
doctrine,176 Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence provided a 
predictable framework that would give consumers more protection 
in the digital age without necessitating a return to the unnecessarily 
constraining third-party doctrine.177 Reading Justice Sotomayor’s 
Jones concurrence in conjunction with the Carpenter majority’s 
holding provides a solution for avoiding the pitfalls Justice Kennedy 
highlighted in his Carpenter dissent. To avoid a patchwork approach 
to third-party data that depends on obscure “category-by-category 
balancing,”178 or a return to the strict third-party regime of Miller 
and Smith,179 courts should adopt an interpretive stance that 
recognizes consumers have a reasonable expectation that the 
government will not coopt personal technology in order to conduct 
warrantless surveillance. 
                                                 
 175 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 176 See id. at 2226–28 (providing a defense of the third-party doctrine). 
 177 Jones, 565 U.S. at 413–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 178 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2232 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Daniel J. 
Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1528 (2010) 
(“We should . . . start focusing on the hard practical issue of how best to regulate 
government information gathering. The Fourth Amendment should cover 
government information gathering comprehensively rather than haphazardly.”). 
 179 See Solove, supra note 178, at 1532 (“It is increasingly the case that much 
of what we do, buy, and read generates records maintained by third parties. 
Regulation and oversight should not turn on the happenstance of where such 
records are located, and changing technology that increasingly locates them 
outside people’s homes should not suddenly cause them to drop out of the 
regulatory regime.”). 
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“Personal technology” is an intentionally open-ended category 
that includes familiar devices such as smart phones and laptops, 
emerging technologies such as IoT devices, and the data-generating 
programs that power these devices.180 In a world where consumer 
devices interact with one another in complex ways to share and 
aggregate data on their users,181 protecting one specific form of data 
generated from one specific device does little to counter the rising 
tide of surveillance.182 Rather than create an exhaustive list of 
protected devices or forms of data, which would quickly become 
outdated,183 this approach is intended to provide a flexible guiding 
principle against warrantless surveillance through consumer devices 
that will remain relevant as technology advances. Given the rapid 
pace at which new technologies are introduced and integrated into 
                                                 
 180 See Andrew W. Bagley & Justin S. Brown, Limited Consumer Privacy 
Protections Against the Layers of Big Data, 31 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 483, 490–95 (2014) (describing the “layers” of data regarding 
consumer behavior that accumulate from programs, such as web browsers and 
applications, contained on personal electronic devices, and the manner in which 
IoT devices add an additional layer to this system by extending internet 
connectivity to physical objects). 
 181 See id. at 491–92 (“The increasing number of software applications 
collecting data in Web 2.0 and social media is now augmented by physical devices 
as part of the budding ‘Internet of Things.’ The layers of the broadband ecosystem 
are expanding as users interact with the Internet in more ways than accessing static 
websites and communicating over instant messaging. For example, retailers now 
use Wi-Fi beacons to track shoppers in the physical world, and consumers use 
their mobile devices to pay for real world goods. Information from such 
interactions can be combined with other data from Web usage to create all-
encompassing marketing profiles of specific consumers.”). 
 182 See id. at 493 (“It should be noted that users may still transmit enough data 
to paint a comprehensive picture of their lives regardless of whether they are part 
of a singular company’s digital ecosystem or opt to use the hardware, software, 
and connectivity platforms of wholly different entities.”). 
 183 See Ferguson, supra note 43, at 823 (“The drive for innovation, consumer 
efficiency, and self-awareness has turned ordinary activity into valuable data. 
Because of this valuable data, more and more ‘things’ are being created to collect 
that information. The proliferation of smart objects brings with it the proliferation 
of surveillance capabilities, a reality that statutory or constitutional law will soon 
need to address.”). 
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daily life,184 an unpredictable “category-by-category balancing”185 
approach risks isolating Fourth Amendment protection to aging 
technologies, while newer technologies that present greater risks of 
surveillance remain unprotected.186 
Justice Sotomayor outlined an approach that recognized the risk 
of surveillance through personal technology, stating that “[t]he 
Government usurped Jones’ property for the purpose of conducting 
surveillance on him, thereby invading privacy interests long 
afforded, and undoubtedly entitled to, Fourth Amendment 
protection.”187 Because Katz recognized that “the reach of the Fourth 
Amendment does not ‘turn upon the presence or absence of a 
physical intrusion,’”188 formulating the question in terms of coopting 
personal technology into a means of surveillance avoids both the 
traditional physical trespass approach from Jones189 and the 
contorted balancing test from Carpenter.190 Justice Sotomayor 
recommended that, rather than strictly adhering to the third-party 
doctrine,191 courts should “ask whether people reasonably expect 
                                                 
 184 See id. at 817–18 (describing the increased use and availability of IoT 
devices). 
 185 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2232 (2018) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting); see also Solove, supra note 178, at 1528 (“We should . . . start 
focusing on the hard practical issue of how best to regulate government 
information gathering. The Fourth Amendment should cover government 
information gathering comprehensively rather than haphazardly.”). 
 186 See Bloom and Clark, supra note 10, at 168 (“The late Justice Scalia in his 
2001 majority opinion in Kyllo v. [United States], a case involving thermal 
imaging, opined that ‘while the technology used in the present case was relatively 
crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are 
already in use or in development.’”) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 
36 (2001)). 
 187 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413–14 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511–12 (1961)). 
 188 Id. at 414 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)). 
 189 Id. at 404, 410 (majority opinion). 
 190 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2231–32 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(citing majority opinion at 2216, 2219–20). 
 191 Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“More fundamentally, 
it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no expectation 
of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is 
ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information 
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that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner 
that enables the government to ascertain, more or less at will, their 
political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”192 Because 
this question focuses on the “attributes”193 of government 
surveillance (data aggregation from connected items in personal 
use),194 and the sensitive information such surveillance may 
disclose,195 formulating the question in this manner provides a more 
predictable and comprehensive means of evaluating other types of 
data held by third parties. This approach lends itself well to a 
predictable expansion of individual privacy protection. 
Protecting data generated on personal devices from being 
coopted into a means of government surveillance would be one way 
to enact scholarly recommendations that “the Fourth Amendment 
should provide protection whenever a problem of reasonable 
significance can be identified with a particular form of government 
information gathering.”196 Law enforcement’s ability to access the 
vast amounts of data held by third-party businesses without a 
warrant presents “a problem of reasonable significance”197 that 
courts now have the opportunity to resolve by reading Carpenter 
alongside Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence. Protecting 
personal technology from being coopted and turned into a means of 
warrantless surveillance provides a broad, stable base for protecting 
consumer privacy under the Fourth Amendment in a world where 
“physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of 
                                                 
about themselves in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 192 Id. at 416. 
 193 Id. (“I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account when 
considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the 
sum of one’s public movements.”). 
 194 See id. (“I do not regard as dispositive the fact that the government might 
obtain the fruits of GPS monitoring through lawful conventional surveillance 
techniques.”) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 535 U.S. 27, 35, n.2 (2001)). 
 195 See generally Michael Gentithes, The End of Miller’s Time: How Sensitivity 
Can Categorize Third-Party Data After Carpenter, 5 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3155644 
(recommending that courts focus on the sensitivity of gathered data in determining 
whether a search has occurred). 
 196 Solove, supra note 178, at 1514. 
 197 Id. 
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surveillance.”198 This standard should be applied both to the real-
time gathering of information at issue in Jones and the historical 
data accessed in Carpenter. 
As Justice Sotomayor noted, the government’s ability to conduct 
large-scale surveillance through personal technology has high costs 
for society: “[a]wareness that the government may be watching 
chills associational and expressive freedoms. And the government’s 
unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of 
identity is susceptible to abuse.”199 Location data is not unique in 
raising these concerns,200 as the Carpenter majority suggested.201 
Rather, most activities on personal technology raise these concerns, 
as third parties have access to uniquely sensitive data in enormous 
quantities from a variety of uses.202 Consumers should not lose 
Fourth Amendment protections for this aggregated data merely 
because it is held by a business.203 By focusing on the means of 
collecting data and protecting consumers from warrantless 
government surveillance through their own personal technology, 
courts would avoid the logical contortions inherent in the Carpenter 
majority’s unstructured approach. This interpretive stance would 
also assist in returning Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to the 
comprehensive standard originally envisaged by Katz.204 
                                                 
 198 Jones, 565 U.S. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Alito, J., 
concurring, 424–29). 
 199 Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 200 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2232 (2018) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the variety of business records that could match the 
majority’s description of why CSLI is unique and deserves protection). 
 201 See id. at 2223 (majority opinion). 
 202 See Bagley & Brown, supra note 180, at 490–95. 
 203 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (listing the various 
ways consumers disclose sensitive information in large amounts to third-party 
businesses and arguing that consumers would object to warrantless government 
access to this data). 
 204 See Milligan, supra note 74, at 23 (“This reliance on property law, along 
with the Court’s ratification of old rules and its drift away from public 
expectations of privacy, make clear that Katz failed in its promise to reorient 
‘search’ doctrine along the lines of an objective and evolving privacy standard.”). 
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B. Future Applications 
Considering the plethora of sensitive personal data that is 
increasingly generated by personal technology and held by 
businesses demonstrates the advantages of reading Carpenter 
alongside Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence. This interpretive 
stance provides more predictable protections for consumer data than 
reading Carpenter alone. The hypothetical example in this section 
discusses the protection of data generated from IoT devices, but 
could also apply to less novel forms of data, such as that generated 
on smartphone applications or laptops. Although IoT devices offer 
consumers unparalleled conveniences, such as the ability to reorder 
grocery items as they are depleted,205 they also present unparalleled 
disclosure of formerly private data to third-party businesses.206 
A hypothetical application of Carpenter when read alongside 
Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence demonstrates the 
effectiveness of an interpretive stance that looks at the means of data 
acquisition and the sensitive personal information surveillance may 
disclose.207 By preventing law enforcement from usurping data 
generated from personal technology to conduct warrantless 
surveillance, this standard protects data generated on IoT devices 
from warrantless search. Consider a hypothetical investigation of an 
individual who regularly uses an Alexa speaker device and an 
Alexa-compatible smart microwave located in her home.208 Every 
evening at 10:35, she instructs Alexa to play her favorite radio 
station, while instructing the microwave to heat a cup of tea. Both 
devices record their respective vocal commands, translate them into 
action, and send the data to Amazon servers for storage.209 Over 
time, this data becomes a comprehensive record of this hypothetical 
consumer’s evening routine, which is stored and maintained by 
Amazon.210 If law enforcement later suspects this consumer of 
                                                 
 205 See Zwerdling, supra note 1. 
 206 See Ferguson, supra note 43, at 807–08. 
 207 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 416–17 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (discussing data 
collection and aggregation while questioning the third-party doctrine); see also 
Solove, supra note 178, at 1514. 
 208 See Bogost, supra note 3 (discussing the use of Alexa-compatible devices). 
 209 See id. 
 210 See Zwerdling, supra note 1. 
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committing a crime during the time she typically instructs her Alexa 
speaker to play music and her smart microwave to heat a cup of tea, 
the data held by Amazon would reveal whether or not she was using 
these devices on the night in question, and perhaps, whether or not 
she was at home.211 This data could quickly undermine, or support, 
any alibi this consumer presented, and law enforcement would be 
eager to access this information, along with the data from any of the 
consumer’s other “smart” devices.212 
Reading Carpenter alongside Justice Sotomayor’s Jones 
concurrence would require law enforcement officers to obtain a 
warrant before accessing this consumer’s data generated by Alexa 
or other “smart” devices. Because this interpretive stance requires a 
warrant before law enforcement may gather aggregated data 
generated through personal technology,213 this consumer’s evening 
routine as recorded by her Alexa-compatible devices would fall 
squarely within the Fourth Amendment’s protection. The IoT 
devices disclose this hypothetical consumer’s evening routine by 
collecting and aggregating data from a connected consumer 
device,214 thereby presenting the means-based surveillance 
capability this interpretive stance is calculated to guard against.215 
The data at issue in this scenario also implicates Justice Sotomayor’s 
concerns about data collection that reveals sensitive information 
about “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations.”216 This consumer’s Alexa devices could generate data 
disclosing her choice of guests and could document the questions 
and commands she gives the device.217 Thus, using a combined 
                                                 
 211 See id. 
 212 See id.; see also Ferguson, supra note 43, at 819 (discussing the implications 
of connected “smart” devices). 
 213 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416–17 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (discussing surveillance through aggregated data). 
 214 See Bogost, supra note 3; see also Posadas, supra note 19, at 75–78 
(describing IoT devices and the large amounts of data they generate). 
 215 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 413–14 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also Solove, 
supra note 178, at 1514 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment should provide protection 
whenever a problem of reasonable significance can be identified with a particular 
form of government information gathering.”). 
 216 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 217 See Zwerdling, supra note 1. 
34 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. [VOL. 20: 1 
interpretation of Carpenter and Justice Sotomayor’s Jones 
concurrence that focuses on both the means of data collection and 
the sensitive personal information this data could disclose protects 
data generated on this consumer’s “smart” devices from warrantless 
search. 
Reading Carpenter alone, however, makes the outcome of this 
hypothetical less clear. First, the requested data does not directly 
provide aggregated location information: it can show whether this 
consumer was at home, but does not provide “a detailed and 
comprehensive record of the person’s movements.”218 Second, it is 
unclear whether a court would consider verbal commands to be a 
“qualitatively different category”219 than bank records and telephone 
numbers.220 The court might consider the actual “content” of the 
command to be protected, but allow warrantless access to data 
indicating when, and whether, a command was made.221 Finally, a 
court could conclude that, unlike CSLI, the collection of data from 
Alexa devices is not “inescapable and automatic,”222 since the 
devices record data generated from commands. Therefore, a court 
might conclude, without the consumer’s instruction to heat a cup of 
tea, the “smart” microwave would have no data to record.223 
                                                 
 218 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018). 
 219 Id. at 2216–17. 
 220 Id. 
 221 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (distinguishing a pen 
register from listening to a protected telephone conversation because the pen 
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On the other hand, a court might decide to extend protection to 
Alexa-generated data by relying on a different set of epithets the 
Carpenter Court used to describe CSLI. For example, a court could 
decide that data from an Alexa-compatible device is “detailed, 
encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled,”224 since it is generated by 
a commonly-used device that records and transmits verbal cues. 
Additionally, data generated from an Alexa-compatible device fits 
the Carpenter Court’s description of CSLI as “remarkably easy, 
cheap, and efficient compared to traditional investigative tools,”225 
and could be considered a form of “tireless and absolute 
surveillance.”226 
By failing to articulate a clear standard for applying its decision 
to future technologies, the Carpenter Court risks implementing a 
system that protects data generated from personal devices 
haphazardly.227 Without a guiding interpretive structure, protection 
of other forms of data held by third-party businesses could hinge on 
which of the Carpenter majority’s various descriptions of CSLI a 
lower court chooses to use. Alternatively, lower courts could find 
that no other forms of data rise to this level of sensitivity, rendering 
CSLI an anomalous exception to the third-party doctrine. However, 
the Carpenter majority’s lack of clarity also presents an opportunity 
to extend Fourth Amendment protection to other forms of 
aggregated data generated by personal technology and held by third 
parties. Courts should look to the Carpenter decision as a means to 
extend Fourth Amendment protections to other forms of data, while 
reading Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence to provide structure 
and breadth to this approach. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Although Carpenter represents a significant step forward for 
individual privacy rights by protecting historical CSLI from 
                                                 
 224 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct at 2216. 
 225 Id. at 2218. 
 226 Id.; see also Chokshi, supra note 223. 
 227 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court 
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S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014)). 
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warrantless search, the opinion risks becoming a mere caveat to the 
third-party doctrine if interpreted narrowly. Additionally, the 
majority’s haphazard approach risks implementing a system that 
requires “qualitatively different”228 types of third-party records 
before Fourth Amendment protections apply, without providing 
guidelines to assist courts in determining which records satisfy this 
requirement. Rather than following this narrow, contorted approach, 
courts should read Carpenter alongside Justice Sotomayor’s Jones 
concurrence, thereby protecting data generated from personal 
devices in order to provide a broad, stable foundation for preventing 
other equally concerning forms of government surveillance. CSLI, 
sensitive as it may be, should not be the only category of aggregated 
consumer information held by third-party businesses that is 
protected after Carpenter. 
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